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ABSTRACT 
U.S. asylum law has served as a model for other nations who 
are parties to the Convention on the Status of Refugees and its Pro-
tocol.  The Board of Immigration Appeals approach to the protec-
tion of those who are persecuted because of their “Particular Social 
Group” has been applauded for “protecting [groups] against dis-
criminatory denial of core human rights”.  It has risen to be the 
preferred analytical approach of common law countries leading to 
groups such as homosexuals, transsexuals, and women subject to 
restrictive social and religious mores being granted protection from 
persecution.  However over the past 10 years the Board has seem-
ingly stepped away from its human rights stance in support of 
PSGs, leading to allegations that the United States is failing in its 
Convention obligations.  This article seeks to assess the impact of 
the Board’s new analytical framework for determining PSGs.  Oth-
er State parties to the Refugees Convention have adopted similar 
criteria in assessing PSG claims without the same concerns.  An 
analysis of this jurisprudence provides a useful comparison to not 
only measure the impact of the new approach but also provides 
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guidance for those involved in PSG claims.  This article does con-
clude that the United States’ new requirements of particularity and 
social distinction while aligning in many respects with the ap-
proach of other countries, ultimately poses a danger of denial of 
human rights; that this danger because of the interpretation and 
application of the framework preferred by the Board poses a great-
er threat to human rights than in other countries.  Finally with this 
reality proven, the article seeks to address how asylum applicants 
and their counsel may counter these foreseeable dangers. 
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1. INTRODUCTION
“An attempt to confine the denotation of the term ‘a partic-
ular social group’ in order to restrict the protection accord-
ed by the [Refugee] Convention is inappropriate where the 
‘object and purpose of the Convention is the protection so 
far as possible of the equal enjoyment by every person of 
fundamental rights and freedoms . . . .’”1 
Signatories to the United Nations Convention on the Status of 
Refugees2 (Refugee Convention) and its Protocol3 spent much of 
the final two decades of the Twentieth Century grappling with 
whether to recognize groups such as homosexuals, transsexuals, 
victims of domestic violence, and women subject to limiting social 
and religious mores.  The issue was whether these groups should 
be protected when faced with persecutory acts within their state.  
At the time the Refugee Convention was created, these groups 
were not within the contemplation of the drafters—persecution 
having been focused upon those who differ because of their race, 
religion, nationality, or political opinion.  However, in the wake of 
the horrors of the Holocaust, the United Nations (UN) responded 
to the conceivable threat of the yet to be foreseen atrocities against 
yet to be identified groups, incorporating the “Particular Social 
Group” (PSG) ground in Article 1(A)(2) of the Refugee Conven-
tion.4  It is the PSG ground that required parties to the Convention 
and Protocol to eventually afford protection against persecution to 
homosexuals, transsexuals, victims of domestic violence, and 
women subject to restrictive social and religious mores.  While the 
United States (U.S.), like other countries, struggled with the exten-
sion of protection to these groups; ultimately, in light of the cir-
cumstances of the Twentieth Century world it was prepared to ex-
tend protection and grant asylum to those who were members of 
1 A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225, 236 
(Austl.). 
2 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 189 U.N.T.S. 
137, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES 633 (T. Alexander 
Aleinikoff et al. eds., 1967) [hereinafter Refugee Convention 1951]. 
3 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, June 11, 1967, 
606 U.N.T.S. 267, in IMMIGRATION & NATIONALITY LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, su-
pra note 2, at 648 [hereinafter 1967 Protocol]. 
4 Refugee Convention 1951, supra note 2, at art. 1. 
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these PSGs.5  In fact, U.S. jurisprudence in determining which 
groups should or should not be protected rose to become the dom-
inant approach of common law countries.6  The U.S. Board of Im-
migration Appeals’ protected characteristics test was applauded 
for supporting the spirit of the Refugee Convention by affording 
“protection against discriminatory denial of core human rights en-
titlements.”7 
In the twenty-first century, it is former gang members, youth 
vulnerable to recruitment by gangs, homeless and abandoned chil-
dren, females subject to forced sexual relationships with gang 
members, and informants on drug cartels and organized crime that 
form a sample of the groups now seeking protection under the PSG 
ground.  The association with organized crime, gangs, and drugs 
make many of them unpalatable to sections of U.S. society.  Their 
undesirable nature coupled with concerns over the growing num-
bers seeking asylum under the PSG ground may have been the cat-
alyst for the Board of Immigration Appeals rejecting its prior hu-
manitarian approach to protecting PSGs from persecution.  The 
approach of the Board has been met with outcry from asylum ad-
vocates, human rights commentators, and rejection by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).  The United 
States has been accused of failing to accord protection to those 
whose core human rights are being denied and thus failing in its 
5 See Heranandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (grant-
ing asylum to a member of the PSG of “gay men with female sexual identities in 
Mexico”); In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 368 (BIA 1996) (granting asylum to a 
young woman who, because of her tribal membership, faced FGM); In re Toboso-
Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 823 (BIA 1990) (granting asylum to a gay Cuban 
man). 
6 MICHELLE FOSTER, THE ‘GROUND WITH THE LEAST CLARITY’: A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF JURISPRUDENTIAL DEVELOPMENTS RELATING TO ‘MEMBERSHIP OF A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP’ 6 (2012), http://www.unhcr.org/4f7d8d189.html 
[https://perma.cc/6RAA-XXNH].  See also T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Protected 
Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the Meaning of ‘Membership of a 
Particular Social Group’ in REFUGEE PROTECTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: UNHCR’S 
GLOBAL CONSULTATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 263, 275 (Erika Feller, 
Volker Türk & Frances Nicholson eds., 2003) (discussing the United States’ ap-
proach to social groups). 
7 Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Montoya, Appeal No. CC/15806/2000, 
at 13–15 (27 Apr. 2001) (IAT) (Eng.); Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] NZAR 
545, ¶ 104 (N.Z.); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Regina v. Immi-
gration Appeal Tribunal and Another Ex Parte Shah [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 640 (HL) 
(appeal taken from Eng.); Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 739 (Can.). 
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responsibilities as a party to the Refugee Convention.8  The Board 
has responded by stating its current approach to the PSG ground is 
not a departure from its earlier jurisprudence and, in fact, is in con-
formity with its prior approach to determining whether or not a 
claimed group qualified for Convention protection.9    
It is the aim of this article to determine whether or not the cur-
rent approach of the Board of Immigration Appeals does in fact 
impose additional limitations on the ability of groups to seek pro-
tection under the PSG ground, and if so, whether this is a failure on 
the part of the United States to uphold its Convention obligations.  
Despite the evolution of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ pro-
tected characteristics test to become the dominant approach of 
common law countries, it has not been the sole methodology em-
ployed.  Moreover, the Board’s new approach does bear striking 
similarity to that of other party nations to the Refugee Convention.  
The UNHCR has not claimed that these analytical frameworks 
constitute a failure in Convention protection.  
To make an informed assessment this article will first analyze 
the evolution of the PSG ground including the significant role that 
the United States has played in creating an internationally accepted 
humanitarian approach to PSG protection.  The Board’s new tripar-
tite test will then be explicated and a comparative analysis of the 
test will be undertaken with those nations who have adopted simi-
lar methodologies for assessing protection under the PSG ground.  
Ultimately however, it will be shown that the Board’s new tripar-
tite test while having commonality with these approaches is not 
equivalent and indeed falls short of the protective measures advo-
cated by these countries.  Finally, the greatest weakness of the new 
test, its malleability, will be explored to expose the dangers that 
may ultimately lead the United States to violate its international 
obligations.  
2. THE CREATION AND EARLY EVOLUTION OF THE PSG GROUND
Membership of a Particular Social Group constitutes one of the 
five protected grounds by which persons fleeing persecution in 
8 Refugee Convention 1951, supra note 2. 
9 In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 211 (BIA 2014) (citing Henriquez-Rivas v. 
Holder, 707 F.3d 1081, 1084 (9th Cir. 2013) (en banc)).  
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their countries of origin may seek asylum.10  In theory, individuals 
who have been persecuted, or face a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion, because of their race, religion, political opinion, nationality, or 
particular social group are equally entitled to the protection afford-
ed by International Law11 and the laws of the United States.12  In 
assessing asylum claims, there has always been deference to those 
seeking protection from persecution based on race, religion, na-
tionality, and political opinion as opposed to those seeking protec-
tion from persecution induced by their PSG.  This is even though 
membership in a PSG is the second most claimed ground in the 
United States.13   
Part of the reason can be traced to the legal jurisprudence that 
has evolved in relation to the respective grounds.  Over the past 
thirty years, a consistent and well-understood line of precedent has 
evolved as to the groupings of “race,” “religion,” “nationality,” 
and “political opinion.”  Society’s familiarity with these classifica-
tions, the ability to understand what is meant by persons being of a 
particular race—having a certain nationality, holding a political 
opinion, or being part of and or practicing a certain religion—has 
necessarily resulted in an ease of understanding and a comfort of 
application within the realm of asylum law.  Despite attempts by 
the legal system, the same degree of clarity has not been attained 
for the PSG ground. 
 The circumstances surrounding the inclusion of “membership 
in a particular social group” in the Refugee Convention have 
fueled this uncertainty.14  Its last minute inclusion at the behest of 
Sweden and its unanimous adoption by the members of the United 
Nations without further debate15 has led to the perception that the 
10 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(42) (2014).  See also Refugee Convention 1951, supra note 2, 
at art. 1(A)(2) (stating the five grounds for refugee protection). 
11 Id. at art. 12(2).  
12 Immigration & Nationality Act of 1952 § 101, 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (1952); 8 
C.F.R. § 101.1 (2015).
13  “After political opinion claims, the largest body of U.S. asylum and with-
holding jurisprudence is based upon claims of membership in a particular social 
group.”  2 SHANE DIZON & NADINE WETTSTEIN, IMMIGRATION LAW SERVICE § 10:137 
(2d ed. 2008). 
14 Michael G. Heyman, Asylum, Social Group Membership and the Non-State Ac-
tor: The Challenge of Domestic Violence, 36 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 767, 769 (2003); 
FOSTER, supra note 6, at 2; Alienikoff, supra note 6, at 265–66. 
15 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons: Summary Rec. of the Twenty-Third Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3.19, 
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criterion was ill conceived—simply “an afterthought.”16  The ex-
planation at the time provided by the Swedish Representative was 
that “experience has shown that certain refugees had been perse-
cuted because they belonged to particular social groups. The draft 
Convention made no provision for such cases, and one designed to 
cover them should accordingly be included.”17  Arguably, recogni-
tion that a forward-thinking, rather than a response-driven, ap-
proach by the United Nations was essential in the wake of the Hol-
ocaust—the need to counter as yet unforeseen forms of persecution 
to yet to be identified groups.18 
That the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) does not pro-
vide a definition of any of the protected grounds has compounded 
the difficulties associated with establishing protection under the 
PSG ground.19  When this provision was incorporated into the Ref-
ugee Act of 1980,20 Congress did not debate nor discuss the inclu-
sion of the PSG ground.21  Rather, Congress was primarily con-
                                                                                                                                   
at 14 (Nov. 26, 1951) (including members from:  Australia, Austria, Belgium, Can-
ada, Colombia, Denmark, Egypt, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Greece, 
Iraq, Israel, Italy, Luxembourg, Monaco, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzer-
land, Turkey, United Kingdom, United States of America, Venezuela, and Yugo-
slavia). 
16 ATLE GRAHL-MADSEN, THE STATUS OF REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 219 
(1966). 
17 Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Status of Refugees and Stateless 
Persons, Summary Rec. of the Third Mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.3, at 14 (Nov. 
19, 1951).  See also Fatin v. I.N.S., 12 F.3d 1233, 1239 (3d Cir. 1993) (acknowledging 
that the term social group in the context of refugees is ill-defined). 
18 Arthur C. Helton, Persecution on Account of Membership in a Social Group as a 
Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 41–42, 45 (1983); David L. 
Neal, Women as a Social Group: Recognizing Sex-Based Persecution as Grounds for Asy-
lum, 20 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 203, 229 (1998).  See also A v Minister for Immi-
gration and Ethnic Affairs (1997) 190 CLR 225, 236 (Austl.) (stating the PSG 
ground “was intended to be a ‘safety net’ for any who fell within it”); GRAHL-
MADSEN, supra note 16, at 20. 
19 In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 232 (BIA 1985).  Courts have commented 
upon the difficulties this has created in its interpretation and application.  See Val-
diviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 594 (3d Cir. 2011) 
(“The concept is even more elusive because there is no clear evidence of legislative 
intent.”); HongYing Gao v. Gonzales, 440 F.3d 62, 66–67 (2d Cir. 2006) (stating that 
social group is “the least well defined” ground); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1238 (noting the 
struggle in defining what a social group is); In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 
230 (BIA 2014) (“is ambiguous and difficult to define”).  
20  Pub.L. 96-212, §101(b), 94 Stat. 102, 102 (1980). 
21  See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 594 (stating that looking into the leg-
islative intent does not provide clarifications); Koudriachova v. Gonzales, 490 F. 
3d 255, 260 (2d Cir. 2007) (indicating that the value gained from the legislative his-
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cerned “to bring United States refugee law into conformance with 
the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees 
. . . to which the United States acceded in 1968.”22  
      What seemed a forward-thinking idea, a living provision 
capable of evolving in a rapidly changing world, has been met with 
confusion, resistance, and some would argue panic.  The lack of 
certainty in its meaning, the potential breadth of its application, 
and its fecundity for bringing fictitious claims cultivated an atmos-
phere of fear that countries who were parties to the Convention 
would be inundated by those claiming protection.  “The ‘social 
group’ category was meant to be a catch-all that could include all 
the bases for and types of persecution which an imaginative despot 
might conjure up.”23  
Despite this, when first confronted with the issue, the Board of 
Immigration Appeals24 seemed intent to pay due adherence to the 
spirit of the Convention. 
tory is little to zero); Fatin, 12 F.3d at 1239 (discussing lack of legislative intent). 
22  I.N.S. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 436–37 (1987).  See also Fatin, 12 
F.3d at 1239 (discussing how social group was added to U.S. refugee law).  While
the lack of discussion by Congress of the PSG ground is often cited, it is impru-
dent not to recognize that there was similarly no discussion of the other four pro-
tection grounds.
23  Nancy Kelly, Gender-Related Persecution: Assessing the Asylum Claims of 
Women, 26 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 625, 648 (1993) (citing Arthur C. Helton, Persecution 
on Account of Membership in a Social Groups as a Basis for Refugee Status, 15 COLUM.
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 39, 41–42, 45 (1983)). 
24  The Board of Immigration Appeals is part of the Executive Office of Immi-
gration Review.  “Its basic purpose is, officially, to correct errors made by the im-
migration judges [and certain decisions of the United States Citizenship and Im-
migration Services] and to resolve complex legal questions concerning the 
administration of the immigration and refugee laws.”  Judge Stephen Reinhardt, 
Judicial Independence and Asylum Law in INTERNATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REFUGEE
LAW JUDGES 5TH CONFERENCE 327, 332 (2002), 
http://www.iarlj.org/general/images/stories/WorldConferences/5-2002-
wellington.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QRC-83EQ].  The Board issues both preceden-
tial and non-precedential decisions.  For a general discussion of the role of the 
Board see DEBORAH E. ANKER, LAW OF ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 13–15 (2011). 
See also Organization, Jurisdiction, and Powers of the Board of Immigration Ap-
peal, 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1 (describing the Board’s functions and characteristics).   
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3. U.S. EVOLUTION OF THE PSG GROUND—FROM CLARITY TO
CONFUSION 
3.1.  1985–2006—Acosta and “Protected Characteristics” 
In the 1985 seminal case of Acosta,25 the Board of Immigration 
Appeals sought to bring clarity26 to the “Particular Social Group” 
ground, through the creation of its “protected characteristics” 
test.27  The doctrine was fashioned to provide homogeneity with 
the other enumerated grounds of “race, religion, nationality or po-
litical opinion,” which the Board concluded “restrict refugee status 
to individuals who are either unable by their own actions, or as a 
matter of conscience should not be required, to avoid persecu-
tion.”28  The immutability or fundamental ideology of the charac-
teristic being central to the assessment of whether or not a PSG falls 
within the protective intentions of the INA and the Refugee Con-
vention, the Court in Acosta noted:  
[P]ersecution on account of membership in a particular so-
cial group [encompasses] persecution that is directed to-
ward an individual who is a member of a group of persons
all of whom share a common, immutable characteristic. The
shared characteristic might be an innate one such as sex,
color, or kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a
shared past experience such as military leadership or land
ownership. The particular kind of group characteristic that
will qualify under this construction remains to be deter-
mined on a case-by-case basis. However, whatever the
25  In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211 (BIA 1985). 
26  Id. at 232. 
27  Id. 
28  “Each of these grounds describes persecution aimed at an immutable 
characteristic: a characteristic that either is beyond the power of an individual to 
change or is so fundamental to individual identity or conscience that it ought not 
be required to be changed. Thus, the other four grounds of persecution enumerat-
ed in the Act and the Protocol restrict refugee status to individuals who are either 
unable by their own actions, or as a matter of conscience should not be required, 
to avoid persecution.”  Id. at 233 (internal citations omitted).  
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common characteristic that defines the group, it must be 
one that members of the group either cannot change or 
should not be required to change because it is fundamental 
to their individual identities or consciences.29 
The “protected characteristics approach” supports the funda-
mental ideals behind the Refugee Convention of safeguarding the 
core human rights of individuals when their state refuses to or fails 
to provide protection.30  
For the next 20 years the protected characteristics test was ap-
plied by all Federal Circuit Courts save for the Ninth Circuit,31 and 
by 2000 it too was prepared to adopt the protected characteristics 
test as an alternative test32 for establishing a protected PSG.33  The 
application of protected characteristics permitted the recognition of 
numerous PSGs not within the specific consideration of the mem-
bers of the UN at the time of the adoption of the Refugee Conven-
tion or then contemplated as a source of persecution by a 1951 
world—an effective application of the Swede’s living, breathing 
29 Id. 
30  As the Supreme Court of Canada explained when adopting the Acosta ap-
proach, it is consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention:  “general 
underlying themes of the defense of human rights and anti-discrimination that 
form the basis for the international refugee protection initiative.”  Ward v. Cana-
da, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 739 (Can.).  See also Decision of the Refugee Appeal Board 
South Africa (Applicant’s name redacted), May 13, 2002, 15–16 (S. Afr.) (on file 
with author) (determining that homosexuals in Nigeria are a social group under 
the Acosta definition); Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 61 (N.Z.) (stating that an 
Iraqi homosexual belongs to a social group); Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] 
NZAR 545, ¶ 104 (N.Z) (indicating that women make up a social group); JAMES C.
HATHAWAY, THE LAW OF REFUGEE STATUS 161 (1991) (asserting that the protected 
characteristics approach upholds “the specific situation known to the drafters-
concern for the plight of persons whose social origins put them at more general 
commitment to grounding refugee claims in civil or political status.”). 
31  The Ninth Circuit required that for a PSG to be protected its members 
must be united by a “voluntary associational relationship.”  Sanchez-Trujillo v. 
I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1576 (9th Cir. 1986).
32  Artega v. Mukasey, 511 F.3d 940, 944 (9th Cir. 2007); Jie Lin v. Ashcroft, 
377 F. 3d 1014, 1027 (9th Cir. 2004); Aguirre-Cervantes v. I.N.S., 242 F.3d 1169, 
1175 (9th Cir. 2001); Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 
2000). 
33 After 2001, the “protected characteristics” test became the test of preva-
lence in the Ninth Circuit.  See Artega, 511 F.3d at 944 (explaining the standard 
applied by the Ninth Circuit); Lin, 377 F.3d at 1027 (discussing protected charac-
teristics as it relates to refugee status claims based on family membership); Aguir-
re-Cervantes, 242 F.3d at 1175 (applying the protected characteristics in the con-
text of the families as a particular social group). 
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provision.  As a result of the protected characteristics approach, 
groups facing a threat of persecution based on gender,34 sexual ori-
entation,35 tribal and clan membership,36 family membership,37 and 
shared past experiences38 were afforded protection as the common 
characteristic shared by the members of each of these groups is a 
core human right that compels protection.  
The Acosta protected characteristics test has been highly influ-
ential beyond the borders of the United States, finding favor in 
other signatory states including Canada,39 the United Kingdom,40 
South Africa,41 and New Zealand,42 to ultimately become “the 
dominant approach among common law countries.”43  Its concord-
ance with the human rights purpose behind the Convention,44 its 
34  Yadegar-Sargis v. I.N.S., 297 F.3d 596, 604 (7th Cir. 2002) (involving Chris-
tian women in Iran who do not comply with Islamic dress requirements); In re 
Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 365–66 (BIA 1996) (describing women of the Tcham-
ba-Kusuntu tribe who had not been subject to FGM and who opposed it). 
35  Karouni v. Gonzales, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172 (9th Cir. 2005) (“homosexuals”); 
Amfani v. Ashcroft, 328 F.3d 719, 728–30 (3d Cir. 2003) (imputing PSG to Ghana-
ians mistakenly believed to be homosexual); Hernandez-Montiel v. I.N.S., 225 F.3d 
1084, 1087 (9th Cir. 2000) (involving gay men with female sexual identities in Mex-
ico); In re Toboso-Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822 (BIA 1994). 
36  Kasinga, 21 I. & N. at 366–67; In re H-, 21 I. & N. Dec. 337, 342–43 (BIA 
1996). 
37  Lwin v. I.N.S., 144 F.3d 505, 512 (7th Cir. 1998) (regarding parents of Bur-
mese dissidents); Gebremichael v. I.N.S., 10 F.3d 28, 36 (1st Cir. 1993) (involving 
the nuclear family). 
38  Benitez-Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 431 (7th Cir. 2009) (depicting a 
former Salvadoran gang member); Sepulveda v. Gonzales, 464 F.3d 770, 772 (7th 
Cir. 2006) (relating to former employees in the AG’s office in Colombia); Lukwago 
v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 157, 173 (3d Cir. 2003) (mentioning children from northern
Uganda who have escaped from involuntary servitude after being abducted and
enslaved); In re Fuentes, 19 I. & N. Dec 658, 662 (BIA 1988) (involving a former
member of the national police).
39  Ward v. Canada, [1993] 2 S.C.R. 689, 739 (Can.) 
40  E.g., K v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Fornah v. Sec’y of State for 
the Home Dep’t, [2007] 1 A.C. 412, 419 (U.K.); Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home 
Dep’t and Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Another Ex Parte Shah 
[1999] 2 A.C. 629, 640 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.). 
41  Jian-Qiang Fang v. Refugee Appeal Board et al, Case No. 40771/05, [2006] 
ZAGPHC 101 (HC) ¶ 6 (S. Afr.), http://www.saflii.org/za/cases/ZAGPHC/
2006/101.pdf [https://perma.cc/8YE4-LUUW].   
42 Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 61 (N.Z.); Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] 
NZAR 545, ¶ 104 (N.Z). 
43  FOSTER, supra note 6, at 6; Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 275. 
44 Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Montoya, Appeal No. 
CC/15806/2000, at 13–15 (27 Apr. 2001) (IAT) (Eng.) (recognizing that the protect-
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homogeneity with the grounds of race, religion, nationality, and 
political opinion, and its ability to provide a measure that is  “not 
so vague as to admit persons without a serious basis for claims to 
international protection”45 led to its acceptance by these nations.46  
3.2.  2006–2014—The Ascendance of the Requirements of “Social 
Visibility” & “Particularity” 
In 2006, after some twenty-plus years of applying the protected 
characteristics doctrine and facilitating its acceptance by most 
common-law countries who are parties to the Refugee Convention, 
the Board of Immigration Appeals changed the playing field47 in a 
bid to constrain what groups may qualify for protection.48  Two 
additional factors ascended to become obligatory requirements in 
establishing a PSG:  “social visibility” and “particularity.”49      
  Social visibility had made a brief appearance in the contro-
versial 1999 decision of In re R-A-,50 a claim of a Guatemalan wom-
an who had suffered horrific domestic abuse.  In rejecting the 
claimed PSG of “Guatemalan women who have been intimately 
involved with Guatemalan male companions, who believe that 
women are to live under male domination,” the Board opined that 
while the claimed PSG met the protected characteristics test, the 
group was artificially conceived for the purposes of the case51 and 
ed characteristics approach accords “the underlying need for the Convention to 
afford protection against discriminatory denial of core human rights entitle-
ments.”). 
45  HATHAWAY, supra note 30, at 161. 
46  As will be discussed below in Section 4, these countries refused to follow 
the “social perception” approach upon the basis that it was too wide and all en-
compassing. 
47  In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 956–57 (BIA 2006). 
48  FOSTER, supra note 6, at 29–30. 
49  An asylum petitioner must now prove:  (1) that the claimed PSG group 
members meet the protected characteristics doctrine; (2) that the group was suffi-
ciently “particular”; and (3) was “perceived by the community in which they lived 
as a social group.  C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956–57 (explaining how “protected 
characteristics” and “particularity” were referred to by the Board as requirements; 
whereas social visibility was referred to as a “relevant factor”).  
50  22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 1999).  In re R-A- was later vacated by the Attor-
ney General in anticipation of new rules.  In re R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 906 (BIA 
2001).  
51  While the group may have been artificially conceived, this was a product 
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bore no relation to whether Guatemalans perceived the group to 
exist.52  The Board asserted for the first time that Acosta was “the 
starting point for assessing social group claims”53 and had never claimed 
it to be “the ending point,”54 though in so stating they were not asserting 
that the factors taken into account in In re R-A- were requirements for all 
cases.55 
Social visibility did not surface again until 2006, when the 
Board saw it as appropriate to apply this factor in rejecting “former 
noncriminal drug informants working against the Cali drug cartel” 
as a PSG.56  In re C-A- provides insight into the Board’s claimed ba-
sis for the social visibility requirement.  Interestingly, the Board 
professed not to be the author of social visibility criterion but ra-
ther asserted that the birth of the concept could be traced to a 1991 
decision of the Second Circuit57 and Guidelines issued by the 
UNHCR.58  The claimed support for social visibility is questiona-
ble.  The Board’s application of the Second Circuit’s decision in the 
case of In Re C-A-59 is at best selective and at its worst is outright 
contortion, and the UNHCR strenuously denies that it endorses the 
of the Board’s approach to date in dealing with the issue of gender claimed group-
ings and its bid to limit those who are able to claim asylum on the basis of gender-
based persecution for fear of floodgates.  This approach commenced with the 
Board’s articulation of PSGs in In re Kasinga,  21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 368 (BIA 1996) 
(describing women of the Tchamba-Kusuntu tribe who had not been subject to 
female genital cutting and who opposed it).  The success of this claim led asylum 
advocates to articulate PSG claims in a similarly circumscribed and artificial man-
ner. 
52  “For the group to be viable for asylum purposes, we believe there must 
also be some showing of how the characteristic is understood in the alien's society, 
such that we, in turn, may understand that the potential persecutors in fact see 
persons sharing the characteristic as warranting suppression or the infliction of 
harm.”  R-A-, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 918. 
53  Id. at 920. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 958 (BIA 2006). 
57 Id. at 956 (citing Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 664 (2d Cir. 1991)). 
58  C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956, 960 (citing U.N. High Comm’r Human Rights, 
Guidelines on International Protection: “Membership of a particular social group” 
within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Proto-
col relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/02/02 (May 7, 2002), 
http://www.unhcr.org/3d58de2da.pdf [https://perma.cc/5W54-TXFD] [herein-
after UNHCR Guidelines]). 
59 See generally In re C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006). 
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Board’s approach to determining a qualifying PSG.60   
The Board, in relying on Gomez,61 asserted the Second Circuit’s 
precedent “that the members of a social group must be externally 
distinguishable”62 to constitute a social group, requires that the 
group be “socially visible.”63  While the explanation of the test as 
“socially visible” may appear to be synonymous with the Second 
Circuit’s test of “externally distinguishable,”64 the Second Circuit 
had adopted a test of social perception, not social visibility, finding 
that the claimed PSG had to be recognizable by either the appli-
cant’s general society or by the persecutor.65  
In comparison, the Board’s application of social visibility in In 
re C-A-66 and in a number of subsequent decisions was literal; that 
a person who was from the claimed PSG should be visually recog-
nizable to others as belonging to that group for the PSG to exist,67 
what the Board ultimately labeled “ocular visibility.”68  In re C-A-69 
60  Brief of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of the Petitioner at 22, Bueso-Avila v. Holder, 663 F.3d 934 (7th 
Cir. 2010) (No. 09-2878); Brief of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 14, Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 
678 (8th Cir. 2010) (No. 10-1724); UNHCR Valdiviezo-Galdamez, infra note 76, at 17. 
61  Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660 (2d Cir. 1991). 
62  C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956. 
63  Id. at 960–61. 
64  See Gomez, 947 F.2d at 663 (describing the Second Circuit’s refusal to rec-
ognize the PSG of “women who have been previously battered and raped by Sal-
vadorian guerillas” under the following reasoning:  “A particular social group is 
comprised of individuals who possess some fundamental characteristic in com-
mon which serves to distinguish them in the eyes of a persecutor-or in the eyes of 
the outside world in general . . . . A ‘particular social group’ normally comprises 
persons of similar background, habits or social status. . . . Like the traits which dis-
tinguish the other four enumerated categories-race, religion, nationality, and po-
litical opinion-the attributes of a particular social group must be recognizable and 
discrete.  Possession of broadly-based characteristics such as youth and gender 
will not by itself endow individuals with membership in a particular group.”)   
65  Id. at 664. 
66  23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006). 
67  See In re E-A-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 591, 594 (BIA 2008) (describing that “‘per-
sons resistant to gang membership’ lacks the social visibility that would allow 
others to identify its members as part of such a group . . . .  The respondent does 
not allege that he possesses any characteristics that would cause others in Hondu-
ran society to recognize him as one who has refused gang recruitment.”); In re A-
T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 302 (BIA, 2007) (“we are doubtful that young Bambara 
women who oppose arranged marriage have the kind of social visibility that 
would make them readily identifiable to those who would be inclined to perse-
cute them”), vacated and remanded, 24 I. & N. Dec. 617 (BIA 2008). 
68  In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 246 (BIA 2014); In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2017
910 U. Pa. J. Int’l L. [Vol. 38:3 
itself is a perfect example of the Board’s own application of “ocular 
visibility”:  
[T]he very nature of the conduct at issue is such that [the
claimed PSG of confidential informants] are generally out
of the public view. In the normal course of events, an in-
formant against the Cali cartel intends to remain unknown
and undiscovered. Recognizability or visibility is limited to
those informants who are discovered because they appear
as witnesses or otherwise come to the attention of cartel
members.70
The unmistakable implication being that any group that re-
mains underground cannot be literally seen by society and thereby 
cannot be a PSG deserving of protection.  Such an interpretation 
failed to pay due consideration to whether C-A-was perceived by 
either his persecutor or in the eyes of the outside world as differ-
ent, as the Second Circuit had clearly articulated. 71  The Board in-
stead fixated upon whether C-A- would be known on sight as a 
criminal informant by members of the public.72  
The adoption of social visibility signaled abandonment by the 
Board of an approach that interpreted the PSG ground homoge-
nously with the grounds of race, religion, nationality and political 
opinion.  Literal visibility necessitates that a person’s fundamental 
human rights are only worthy of protection once there is actual 
knowledge that he or she is different, and for this to occur, the ap-
plicant must literally become visible to their persecutors.  As a con-
sequence, the applicant is required to place themselves in the face 
of the very jeopardy that they are fleeing and asking nations such 
as the United States to protect them against.  That the individual be 
persecuted before they can claim protection has never been the 
threshold to protection under the Refugee Convention, only that 
the applicant has a “well-founded fear” of persecution.  Such an 
approach is inconsistent with a long line of authority in U.S. immi-
Dec. 208, 216 (BIA 2014). 
69 23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006). 
70 Id. at 960. 
71  Gomez v. I.N.S., 947 F.2d 660, 663 (2d Cir. 1991) (“distinguish them in the 
eyes of a persecutor-or in the eyes of the outside world in general.”) 
72  C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 960 (“Recognizability or visibility is limited to 
those informants who are discovered because they appear as witnesses or other-
wise come to the attention of cartel members.”) 
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gration law, that simply because an individual can avoid persecu-
tion by, for example, remaining ‘in the closet’ as a homosexual, or 
practicing their religion underground, or disguising their heritage 
does not mean the person should not be protected.73  Such an ap-
proach is inconsistent with the United States’ obligations under the 
Refugee Convention.74 
The Board, as previously mentioned, claimed support for the 
criterion of social visibility as an “And” requirement from the 
United Nations High Commissioner of Refugees.75  The UNHCR 
does indeed endorse an approach of “social perception;” however, 
there are two very important factors that the Board did not disclose 
when citing to the UNHCR Social Group Guidelines:  First, the 
UNHCR advocated and still advocates that the “social perception” 
approach is an alternate means by which a PSG may be established 
rather than as an added criterion.76  In countries that have adopted 
the protected characteristics approach according to the UNHCR, 
application of the social perception approach should only occur af-
ter the claimed PSG has not been established pursuant to the pro-
tected characteristics approach,77 to ensure that those for whom 
73  Raskane v. Holder, 562 F.3d 1283, 1288 (10th Cir. 2010); Karouni v. Gonza-
les, 399 F.3d 1163, 1172–73 (9th Cir. 2005); Pozos v. Gonzales, 141 Fed. Appx. 629, 
632 n. 2 (9th Cir. 2005); Antipova v. Attorney Gen., 392 F.3d 1259, 1263–65 (11th 
Cir. 2004); Muhur v. Ashcroft, 355 F.3d 958, 960–61 (7th Cir. 2004); Zhang v. Ash-
croft, 388 F.3d 713, 719–20 (9th Cir. 2004). 
74  U.N. High Comm’r Human Rights, Guidelines on International Protection 
No. 9: Claims to Refugee Status based on Sexual Orientation and/or Gender Iden-
tity within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Pro-
tocol relating to the Status of Refugees, U.N. Doc. HCR/GIP/12/09 (Oct. 23, 2012) 
¶ 31 (“That an applicant may be able to avoid persecution by concealing or by be-
ing ‘discreet’ about his or her sexual orientation or gender identity, or has done so 
previously, is not a valid reason to deny refugee status. As affirmed by numerous 
decisions in multiple jurisdictions, a person cannot be denied refugee status based 
on a requirement that they change or conceal their identity, opinions or character-
istics in order to avoid persecution.”) 
75  C-A-, 23 I. & N. Dec. at 956. 
76 UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, at 3–4; The United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees’ Amicus Curiae Brief in Support of Respondent at 12, 
In re Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2012) (No. A097447286), 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/503653562.html [https://perma.cc/WLV2-
L3LU] [hereinafter UNHCR Valdiviezo-Galdamez]; Brief Amicus Curiae of the Unit-
ed Nations High Commissioner for Refugees in Support of Respondent Francis 
Gatimi at 7–12, In re Gatimi, (BIA 2010) (No. A 69495092), http://
www.refworld.org/docid/4bb0698e2.html [https://perma.cc/B6R5-CKZV] 
[hereinafter UNHCR Gatimi].  
77 See UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, at 3–4. 
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there is an international obligation to protect are protected.  Sec-
ond, social perception is just that, “perception” of a society and 
does not require that the group be “ocularly visible.”78  Not only 
does reference to the UNHCR’s Social Group Guidelines79 make 
this clear, but the UNHCR has in numerous amicus curiae briefs80 
emphatically rejected their support for the Board’s social visibility 
test.81 
In a decision following closely upon the heels of In re C-A-,82 
the Board elevated social visibility from a factor to be considered in 
determining the existence of a PSG to a requirement.83  While the 
Board at one point in the judgment referred to social visibility as a 
factor, it shortly thereafter referred to it as a “requirement.”84  The 
result was that subsequent Circuit Court decisions referring to In re 
A-M-E-85 disclaimed the existence of PSGs on the basis that while
meeting the Acosta protected characteristics approach, the group’s
lack of social visibility was fatal.86  Despite the earlier assertion of
78  The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees’ Amicus Curiae 
Brief in Support of Petitioner at 6–7, Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1082 
(2013) (No. 09-71571 (A098-660-718)), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
4f4c97c52.html [https://perma.cc/3KAG-T288] [UNHCR Henriquez-Rivas].  
79  “[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a common 
characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are perceived as a 
group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, unchangea-
ble, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of 
one’s human rights.”  UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, at 3–4. 
80 See UNHCR Gatimi, supra note 76, at 7–10, 9-12; UNHCR Valdiviezo-
Galdamez, supra note 76, at 11. 
81  See, e.g., UNHCR Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 78, at 6–7 (stressing that the 
protected characteristics and social perception approaches are two separate tests 
and that “[r]equiring applicants to meet both approaches is fundamentally incon-
sistent with the Social Group Guidelines”). 
82  23 I. & N. Dec. 951 (BIA 2006). 
83 See In re A-M-E-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 73–75 (BIA 2007), aff’d, Ucelo-Gomez v. 
Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70 (2d Cir. 2007) (“whether a proposed group has a shared 
characteristic with the requisite “social visibility” must be considered in the con-
text of the country of concern and the persecution feared”). 
84 Id. at 74. 
85  Id. at 73–75. 
86  See e.g., Scatambuli v. Holder, 558 F.3d 53, 60 (1st Cir. 2009) (“[T]hose who 
knew of the petitioners’ identity as informants was quite small; the petitioners 
were not particularly visible.”); Santos-Lemus v. Mukasey, 542 F.3d 738, 746 (9th 
Cir. 2008) (“The harassment appears to have been part of general criminality and 
civil unrest; Santos-Lemus’s ‘group’ was not particularly socially visible to the 
gang . . . .”); In re A-T-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 296, 303 (BIA, 2007) (“[W]e are doubtful 
that young Bambara women who oppose arranged marriage have the kind of so-
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the Board in In re R-A- that the additional criterion of social percep-
tion and visibility within a society “are not prerequisites”87 to es-
tablishing the existence of a PSG, it was now to become the case. 
Particularity was clearly labeled as a requirement in the case of 
In re C-A-.88  Despite so doing, there was a lack of explanation of 
how the particularity requirement should be established by appli-
cants and evaluated by adjudicators.  The Board’s dicta that the 
claimed social group of “noncriminal informants” “. . . is too loose-
ly defined to meet the requirement of particularity”89 and that it 
could “potentially include persons who passed along information 
concerning any of the numerous guerrilla factions or narco-
trafficking cartels currently active in Colombia to the Government 
or to a competing faction or cartel”90 provided little guidance.  Sub-
sequent jurisprudence equated particularity with the ability of the 
claimed group to be “accurately . . . described in a manner suffi-
ciently distinct that the group would be recognized, in the society 
in question, as a discrete class of persons.”91  How this is different 
from the requirement of social visibility was unclear.92  As the case 
law developed, a correlation between discreteness and the size of 
the claimed social group became apparent.93  The greater the size of 
the group, the less likely it could be considered sufficiently particu-
lar.  The imposition of a size requirement upon the PSG invoked 
much criticism.94  It belied consistency with the other protected 
cial visibility that would make them readily identifiable to those who would be 
inclined to persecute them.”). 
87  22 I. & N. Dec. 906, 919 (BIA 2001). 
88  23 I. & N. Dec. 951, 957 (BIA 2006). 
89 Id. 
90 Id. 
91 In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008). 
92 Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 605 (3d 
Cir. 2011). 
93 Portillo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 435 Fed. App'x 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2011) (re-
jecting a proposed social group for being overly broad because it “would serve as 
a catch-all for every former military member who did not fall within one of the 
five protected groups, creating numerosity concerns”); S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 
584 (in which the Board noted that “the size of the proposed group may be an im-
portant factor in determining whether the group can be . . . recognized . . . .”); In re 
A-M-E, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (BIA 2007) (“Because the concept of wealth is so in-
determinate, the proposed group could vary from as little as 1 percent to as much
as 20 percent of the population, or more.”).  See also Malonga v. Mulasey, 546 F. 3d
546, 553 (8th Cir. 2008) (emphasizing the importance of a group’s social visibility).
94 See ANKER, supra note 24, at 348; FOSTER, supra note 6, at 31–32 (“it is not 
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grounds; no size limitation has been imposed upon the grounds of 
race, religion, nationality, or political opinion.95  As such, the Unit-
ed States’ particularity requirement has been perceived as antithet-
ical to the spirit of the Refugee Convention and a repudiation by 
the United States of its international obligations under the treaty.96   
The Board of Immigration Appeal’s new requirements ulti-
mately led to a circuit split.  The Third and Seventh Circuit’s reject-
ed the social visibility and particularity requirements, returning to 
the Acosta protected characteristics approach.97  They determined 
clear how an applicant could successfully establish this essential element”); Brief 
of Amicus Curiae The National Immigrant Justice Center in Support of Petitioner 
at 10–13, Santos v. Holder (3d Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1050), http://
www.immigrantjustice.org/sites/default/files/Santos%20Amicus%20Brief.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EM7R-3EDQ] (discussing the restrictions of the added re-
quirements); Brief for the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 4, Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 
641 (10th Cir. 2012) (No. 10-9527), http://www.refworld.org/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/rwmain?page=search&docid=4c6cdb512&skip=0&query=petitioner%
20rivera-barrientos [https://perma.cc/38FJ-P7J4] (“the Board’s imposition of the 
requirements of “social visibility” and “particularly” may result in refugees being 
erroneously denied international protection”) [hereinafter UNHCR Rivera-
Barrientos]. 
95  See U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR REFUGEES, GUIDANCE NOTE ON REFUGEE CLAIMS
RELATING TO VICTIMS OF ORGANIZED GANGS, ¶ 35 (2010), http://
www.refworld.org/pdfid/4bb21fa02.pdf [https://perma.cc/2GFH-ERSW] (“As 
with other types of claims, the size of the group is also not relevant.”); UNHCR 
Guidelines, supra note 58, at 5 (“The size of the purported social group is not a rel-
evant criterion in determining whether a particular social group exists within the 
meaning of Article 1A(2)”).  
96  UNHCR Rivera-Barrientos, supra note 94, at 4 (offering examples of the 
standard’s restrictions).  See e.g., UNHCR Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 78, at 5 (“the 
‘particularity’ requirement seems to be a reiteration of the ‘social visibility’ test 
and in any event is likewise inconsistent with the Social Group Guidelines, the 1951 
Convention and the 1967 Protocol”). 
97  See Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 594 
(3d Cir. 2011) (“The BIA's requirements of “social visibility” and “particularity” 
are not entitled to Chevron deference.”); Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430–31 
(7th Cir. 2009) (“We join our sister circuits that have held that there is no on-sight 
visibility requirement for a particular social group to be cognizable under the 
INA”); Gatimi v. Holder, 578 F.3d 611, 615–16 (7th Cir. 2009) (“We just don't see 
what work ‘social visibility’ does”).  See also Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 672 (7th 
Cir. 2013) (“[Y]oung Albanian women who live alone” constitute a cognizable so-
cial group as the members of the group are “united by the common and immuta-
ble characteristic of being (1) young, (2) Albanian, (3) women, (4) living alone.”); 
Escobar v. Holder, 657 F.3d 537, 545–47 (7th Cir. 2011) (finding that “former truck-
ers who resisted FARC and collaborated with authorities” could be considered a 
particular social group based upon their immutable past experience—it was also 
considered important that the resistance of the group was based upon their politi-
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social visibility, as a concept, to be illogical,98 unclear,99 and incon-
sistent with past precedent.100  Other circuits joined the Third and 
Seventh Circuits as far as rejecting an interpretation of social visi-
bility that required the applicant’s group status be visible to the 
“naked eye.”101  Particularity in the view of the Third Circuit was 
simply a reiteration of social visibility,102 and the Ninth Circuit, 
while not explicitly rejecting the notion of particularity, stressed 
that broad groupings could still constitute a particular social group 
and that size was irrelevant to the existence of a PSG.103  
cal support of the government, something that they should not be required to 
change). 
98 Gatimi, 578 F.2d at 615 (stating that it “makes no sense”).  See also Sarhan 
v. Holder, 658 F.3d 649, 655 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing Gatimi when describing that the
concept “makes no sense”).
99 See Gatimi, 578 F.2d at 615 (noting the inconsistency of the Board’s opin-
ions on the topic); Benitez-Ramos v. Holder, 589 F.3d 426, 430 (7th Cir. 2009) 
(showing how it is often unclear whether the Board is using the term ‘‘social visi-
bility’’ in the literal sense or in the ‘‘external criterion’’ sense, or even-whether it 
understands the difference).  
100 For example, the Seventh Circuit pointed to the fact that women who 
were yet to be subjected to FGM did not look different to other women in the 
tribe, obviously directing this comment to application of social visibility as requir-
ing ocular observance of the social group trait.  Gatimi, 578 F.2d at 615.  See also 
Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 604 (“it is unclear whether this means that the 
group's shared characteristic must be visible to the naked eye”); Sarhan, 658 F.3d 
at 644 (in which the Seventh Circuit found it irrelevant that women faced with 
honor killings do not look different from other women in their society). 
101 This includes the Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits.  Temu v. 
Holder, 740 F.3d 887, 892–93 (4th Cir. 2014); Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 
667, 669 (6th Cir. 2013); Henriquez-Rivas v. Holder, 707 F.3d 1082, 1087–88 (9th 
Cir. 2013); Rivera-Barrientos v. Holder, 666 F.3d 641, 652 (10th Cir. 2012). 
102  Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 663 F.3d 582, 608 (3d Cir. 
2011) (“In the government's view, ‘particularity’ serves a different function from 
‘social visibility’ in determining whether the asylum applicant has described a 
cognizable social group.”). 
103 The Seventh Circuit pointed out that:  “Many of the groups recognized by 
the Board and courts are indeed quite broad. These include: women in tribes that 
practice female genital mutilation; Matter of Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. at 365, Agbor, 
487 F.3d at 502 (7th Cir. 2007); persons who are opposed to involuntary steriliza-
tion, 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(B); Chen v. Holder, 604 F.3d 324, 332 (7th Cir. 2010); 
members of the Darood clan and Marehan subclan in Somalia, In re H-, 21 I. & N. 
Dec. at 340, 343 (1% of the population of Somalia are members of the Marehan 
subclan); homosexuals in Cuba, In re Toboso–Alfonso, 20 I. & N. Dec. 819, 822–23 
(BIA 1990); Filipinos of Chinese ancestry living in the Philippines, Matter of V–T–
S–, 21 I. & N. Dec. 792, 798 (BIA 1997) (approximately 1.5% of the Philippines 
population has an identifiable Chinese background). . . . The ethnic Tutsis of 
Rwanda numbered close to 700,000 before the genocide of 1994, and yet a Tutsi 
singled out for murder who managed to escape to the United States could surely 
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While the remainder of the Circuits gave due deference to the 
Board’s new requirements, their interpretation and application of 
the requirements differed.  Dependent upon the circuit, for a PSG 
to be socially visible requires an applicant to establish the existence 
of a common characteristic setting them apart from others in the 
society;104 that the alleged PSG must be a perceived as a cohesive 
group by society;105 that the individual is readily identifiable by the 
characteristic;106 or that the group must be perceived by society as 
being at greater risk of persecution.107  In addition, there was in-
consistency as to whom the group must be visible to:  the appli-
cant’s society,108 the applicant’s country,109 the persecutor,110 or vis-
ibility to both the country and the applicant’s community.111  
qualify for asylum in this country. And undoubtedly any of the six million Jews 
ultimately killed in concentration camps in Nazi-controlled Europe could have 
made valid claims for asylum . . . .”  Cece v. Holder, 733 F.3d 662, 674–75 (7th Cir. 
2012) (internal citations included). 
104 Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[T]his Court’s 
reasoning [is] that a ‘particular social group is comprised of individuals who pos-
sess some fundamental characteristic in common which serves to distinguish 
them in the eyes of a persecutor—or in the eyes of the outside world in general.’”).  
See also Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2011) (describing that 
social visibility requires citizens sharing a trait to “constitute a distinct social 
group”). 
105  See Constanza v. Holder, 647 F.3d 749, 753 (8th Cir. 2011) (“a social group 
requires sufficient particularity and visibility such that the group is perceived as a 
cohesive group by society”). 
106  See Lizama v. Holder, 629 F.3d 440, 447 (4th Cir. 2011) (“discussing con-
crete traits that would readily identify a person as possessing those characteris-
tics”). 
107  See Davila-Mejia v. Mukasey, 531 F.3d 624, 629 (8th Cir. 2008) (discussing 
individuals that “were recognized as a group that is at a greater risk of crime in 
general or of extortion, robbery, or threats in particular”). 
108  The First Circuit requires that the claimed PSG be visible to the appli-
cant’s society and rejects that social visibility can be established by claiming the 
PSG is visible to the applicant’s persecutor.  Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3d 
21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010); Amilcar-Orellana v. Mukasey, 551 F.3d 86, 91 (1st Cir. 2008).  
See also Umana-Ramos v. Holder, 724 F.3d 667, 671 (6th Cir. 2013) (describing that 
social visibility “requires ‘that the shared characteristic of the group should gen-
erally be recognizable by others in the community’”); Constanza, 647 F.3d at 753 
(“the group is perceived as a cohesive group by society”). 
109  See Barrientos, 658 F.3d at 1232 (determining whether “citizens of the ap-
plicant's country would consider individuals with the pertinent trait to constitute 
a distinct social group”). 
110  The Second and Fifth Circuits permitted either social visibility of the 
group to society or to the persecutor.  Orellana-Monson v. Holder, 685 F.3d 511, 
522 (5th Cir. 2012); Ucelo-Gomez v. Mukasey, 509 F.3d 70, 73 (2d Cir. 2007). 
111  Barrientos v. Holder, 658 F.3d 1222, 1232 (10th Cir. 2011) (requiring that 
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Similarly the circuits diverged upon the parameters of the particu-
larity requirement upon such issues as whether the size of the 
group was too large;112 the broadness of the proposed PSG;113 
whether the society identified the applicant as belonging to the as-
serted PSG;114 or a combination of these factors.115  
3.3.  2014–Present––Solidification of “Social Distinction” and 
“Particularity” 
In the wake of the controversy and calls for clarity by a number 
of the Federal Circuits,116 on February 7, 2014 the BIA elucidated its 
legal position on when a PSG will qualify as deserving of protec-
tion for asylum in two cases:  In re W-G-R-117 and In re M-E-V-G-.118  
The result was the firm endorsement of a tripartite test for estab-
lishing a “particular social group”; that an applicant is required to 
prove that their claimed PSG shares an immutable characteristic, 
that the group is socially distinct, and that the group is sufficiently 
particular.119  The Board firmly endorsed the obligatory nature of 
all three elements, while elaborating upon and arguably refining 
the requirements in a bid to provide greater clarity. 
“the applicant’s country would consider individuals with the pertinent trait to 
constitute a distinct social group” and “the applicant’s community is capable of 
identifying an individual as belonging to a group”). 
112 See id. at 1230 (“the described group is ‘a potentially large and diffuse seg-
ment of society’”).  
113  Gaitan v. Holder, 671 F.3d 678, 682 (8th Cir. 2012) (“we agree with the BIA 
that Gaitan's articulated social group is not sufficiently narrowed to cover a dis-
crete class of persons”); Zelaya v. Holder, 668 F.3d 159, 166 (4th Cir. 2012) (“I 
reach this conclusion not because the members of the proposed group lack kin-
ship ties, but rather because the characteristics of the group are, in my view, 
broader and more amorphous . . . .”).
114 Mendez-Barrera v. Holder, 602 F.3då 21, 27 (1st Cir. 2010) (holding that 
the group was not socially visible). 
115  See Gashi v. Holder, 702 F.3d 130, 137 (2d Cir. 2012) (requiring that the 
group be finite and its membership be verifiable). 
116  See Rojas-Perez v. Holder, 699 F.3d 74, 81 (1st Cir. 2012) (noting that it is 
particularly unclear how courts are to square the BIA's more recent statements re-
garding the social visibility requirement with its former decisions). 
117 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). 
118  26 I. & N. Dec. 227 (BIA 2014). 
119 See id. at 237 (“Membership in a particular social group must establish 
that the group is (1) composed of members who share a common immutable char-
acteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially distinct within the society 
in question.”). 
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The first element, the time honored “Protected Characteristics” 
Doctrine, continues to require that an applicant establish that the 
members of the PSG:  
share a common, immutable characteristic. The shared 
characteristic might be an innate one such as sex, color, or 
kinship ties, or in some circumstances it might be a shared 
past experience such as former military leadership or land 
ownership . . . However, whatever the common characteris-
tic that defines the group, it must be one that the members 
of the group either cannot change, or should not be re-
quired to change because it is fundamental to their individ-
ual identities or consciences.120  
The Board’s decisions since 2005 have not altered the interpre-
tation of this doctrine; the one difference is that it is only the first 
step in a three-part assessment. 
The second requirement, “Social Distinction,” according to the 
Board is simply a retitling and not a reformulation of the social visi-
bility requirement;121 the retitling of “social visibility” to “social 
distinction” would bring greater clarity to the meaning and appli-
cation of the requirement.122  The Board unequivocally stated that it 
never intended social distinction to require that members of the 
claimed PSG be “socially visible” in the sense of recognizable on 
sight;123 “social visibility does not mean ‘ocular’ visibility-either of 
the group as a whole or of individuals within the group-any more 
than a person holding a protected religious or political belief must 
be ‘ocularly’ visible to others in society.”124  Rather the requirement 
demands “society in general perceives, considers, or recognizes 
persons sharing the particular characteristic to be a group.”125   
120  W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 212 (citing to In re Acosta, 19 I. & N. Dec. 211, 
233 (BIA 1985)). 
121 See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240 (referencing “social distinction”); W-
G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 216 (referencing “social distinction”). 
122 See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 240 (“The renamed requirement ‘social 
distinction’ clarifies that social visibility does not mean ‘ocular’ visibility--either of 
the group as a whole or of individuals within the group--any more than a person 
holding a protected religious or political belief must be ‘ocularly’ visible to others 
in society.”).  
123  Id. at 235–36.  See also W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 211 (discussing social vis-
ibility). 
124  M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 236, 240. 
125 W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 217. 
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Importantly, the relevant society to perceive, consider, or rec-
ognize the grouping is that of the “citizens of the applicant’s coun-
try”126 or “the applicant’s community.”127  Whether it is the “citi-
zens of the applicant’s country” or the “applicant’s community” 
which is the relevant society will depend upon a case-by-case anal-
ysis.128  As the Board indicates, persecution in a remote region of a 
country or in a small subset of the country’s society may require 
that that the relevant society is that of the individual’s immediate 
community rather than citizens of the applicant’s country.129  This, 
at least in theory, neutralizes the suggestion that the asylum appli-
cant must, in all cases, be able to establish that the claimed PSG ex-
ists as distinct in both their immediate community and to citizens 
at large. 
In assessing whether or not the claimed PSG is socially distinct, 
the perception of the persecutor alone cannot be determinative.130  
While the persecutor’s perceptions may be useful as evidence to 
assist in establishing the society in question recognizes the claimed 
PSG,131 “the persecutors’ perception is not itself enough to make a 
group socially distinct.”132  The reason is that the PSG must exist 
separately as a group that society views as distinct, as “persecutory 
conduct alone cannot define the group.”133  Importantly, the Board 
recognizes that persecution can ultimately lead to the creation of a 
group which is distinct in the eyes of the relevant society.134  It may 
be “the catalyst that causes the society to distinguish the [group] in 
a meaningful way and consider them a distinct group . . . .”135  
Some confusion does arise, as the Board’s explanation includes ref-
erence to the members of the PSG who also consider themselves to 
126  Id. 
127  Id. 
128  Id. at 212 (citing I.N.S. v. Aguirre-Aguirre, 526 U.S. 415, 425 (1999)). 
129  See M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 243 (discussing narrowing the analysis to 
a social group within a tribe). 
130 See id. at 242 (indicating that “the persecutors’ perception is not itself 
enough to make a group socially distinct, and persecutory conduct alone cannot 
define the group”).  
131  Id. 
132  Id. (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007)). 
133 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 242. 
134 Id. at 231.  
135 Id. at 243. 
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be a separate group.136  Only time will tell whether this will meta-
morphose into an additional sub-rule of the social distinction ele-
ment or whether it was simply an example that was not to be taken 
literally.  
Particularity, the final element, is aimed at determining who 
does and who does not fall within the group.  For the claimed so-
cial group to be sufficiently particular, the Board requires it to be 
narrowly defined:  “it must not be amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, 
or subjective.”137  This would mean that the circle is large and dif-
fuse, rather than a socially distinct group which has a tight-fitting 
circumference.  To clarify the object behind particularity, the BIA 
endorsed the Ninth Circuit’s approach that “major segments of the 
population will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct social group.”138  
The PSG must be discrete, and to be discrete it must have well de-
fined boundaries.  
The notion behind particularity is to draw a close-fitting circle 
around the group in the sense of providing “a clear benchmark for 
determining who falls within the group”139 and who does not.140  
Therefore, amorphous groups based upon general, wide, all-
encompassing features, such as poverty, youth, and homelessness 
will not meet the delineation required by the Board’s particularity 
element.141  The limits of the group can be tested by cross-
referencing the suggested PSG with the element of social distinc-
tion and asking whether, given the cultural and social context of 
the applicant’s country (and one would assume if necessary com-
munity), the society in question regards the group as discrete, ra-
ther than as generally characteristic of any society that exists.142  In 
136 Id. at 242–43. 
137 In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2004) (citing Ochoa v. Gonza-
lez, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2005)). 
138  Ochoa v. Gonzalez, 406 F.3d 1166, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing Sanchez-
Trujillo v. I.N.S., 801 F.2d 1571, 1577) (9th Cir. 1986)). 
139 W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214 (citing In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 I. & N. 
Dec. 69, 74 (BIA 2007)).  
140  See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (citing with approval Escobar v. Gonza-
les, 417 F.3d 363, 367–68 (3d Cir. 2005) and stating that there is a need to set pe-
rimeters for a protected group). 
141  See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (citing with approval Escobar, 417 F.3d 
at 367–68). 
142  See W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 213 (stating that “the definition of a particu-
lar social group is not addressed in isolation but in context of the society out of 
which the claim for asylum arises”).  
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most cases, it is implicit that the smaller the group the more likely 
it is to be acceptable.  This is subject, of course, to it being socially 
distinct and its members sharing an immutable characteristic.  The 
exercise must not be undertaken devoid of the cross-referencing to 
social distinction, as the applicant’s society can change the width of 
the group.143   
4. THE EVOLUTIONARY IMPACT–SURVIVAL OF ONLY THE FITTEST
PSGS? 
According to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refu-
gees, “the Board’s . . . interpretation of the Social Group Guidelines 
may result in refugees being erroneously denied international pro-
tection . . . in violation of the United States’ fundamental obliga-
tions under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol . . . .”144  It 
must be acknowledged though that the protected characteristics 
approach has never been the sole approach to determining the PSG 
issue and other state parties have and do apply similar standards 
to those of social distinction and particularity when assessing PSG 
claims.  The effect of the Board’s tripartite test may therefore not be 
as great as the concerns that have been expressed by the UNHCR 
and others.  
4.1.  Social Distinction v. Social Perception 
If social distinction, as articulated in the 2014 tripartite test, is 
synonymous with the “social perception” approach of other coun-
tries,145 it may have little meaningful effect upon those claiming 
143 See id. at 217 (indicating that “[t]o have the ‘social distinction’ necessary to 
establish a particular social group, there must be evidence showing that society in 
general perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular charac-
teristic to be a group”). 
144  UNHCR Henriquez-Rivas, supra note 78, at 7. 
145  Australia applies the social perception approach as the exclusive criterion 
for establishing a PSG.  See S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs 
(2004) 217 CLR 387, 409–10 (Austl.).  The United Kingdom applies social percep-
tion as an alternative approach to the protected characteristics approach in estab-
lishing a PSG. See K v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Fornah v. Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] 1 A.C. 412, 419 (U.K).  The UNHCR endorses the 
use of social perception as adopted in Australia and the United Kingdom but as 
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protection under the PSG ground.  This is principled upon the be-
lief that all groups that fulfill the protected characteristics test are 
socially distinct.  Alexander Aleinikoff, former United Nations 
Deputy High Commissioner for Refugees, has asserted in his work, 
Protected Characteristics and Social Perceptions: An Analysis of the 
Meaning of ‘Membership of a Particular Social Group,’ that groups that 
meet the Acosta protected characteristics analysis are inexorably 
perceived by society to be a group; that as members of the group 
are unable to hide the characteristic that defines their group or are 
unwilling to forsake their characteristic because of its fundamental 
nature they fail to avoid persecutory treatment and consequently 
are perceived to be groups within their society.146  Consequently, 
any social group established under the protected characteristics 
approach necessarily meets the social perception approach.147  As 
the UNHCR explains, the protected characteristics approach can be 
“understood to identify a set of groups that constitute the core of 
the social perception analysis.”148  
Given that the protected characteristics approach forms only 
the core of the social perception approach, the necessary implica-
tion is that the latter is in fact a wider test.149  If applied as the sole 
test for determining a PSG, it permits the recognition of more PSGs 
than the protected characteristics approach.150  There are many 
an alternative to the fundamental characteristics approach.  See UNHCR Guide-
lines, supra note 58, at 3–4. 
146 See Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 297 (providing an example of this by de-
scribing that persons are likely to preserve deeply held religious and political 
convictions even if they face harm in doing so because they may view such con-
victions as core to their identities). 
147  See id. at 297–98 (providing a detailed discussion on social perception 
analysis).  This also appears to be the understanding of the UNHCR.  See also 
UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, ¶¶ 9, 11 (outlining guidelines on social group 
status).  
148  See id. ¶ 11 (“[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a 
common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or who are per-
ceived as a group by society. The characteristic will often be one which is innate, 
unchangeable, or which is otherwise fundamental to identity, conscience or the 
exercise of one’s human rights.”).  
149 See Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 272 (providing examples of overlap and 
disparity between the tests).  See also FOSTER, supra note 6, at 13, 74–75 (discussing 
changes in PSG approach beginning in 1977 and stating social perception is “likely 
to accommodate a wider range of groups than is capable of being encompassed 
within the protected characteristics approach”). 
150  See Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 272 (outlining an example case).  See also 
Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 60 (N.Z.) (“The difficulty with the ‘objective ob-
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groups that society perceives to exist that share a characteristic of 
distinction and thereby meet the social perception test but fail to 
meet the protected characteristics requirement; the characteristic of 
distinction is so fundamental that they should not be required to 
forsake it.151  If this is indeed the case, social perception as an add-
ed criterion should have little meaningful effect upon the groups 
that will be recognized as PSGs. 
By way of illustration, Aleinikoff refers to the United Kingdom 
decision of Montoya,152 in which the asylum applicant alleged per-
secution by a Marxist Opposition group—the EPL—because of his 
PSG:  “the status of being an owner of land that is worked for prof-
it.”153  The EPL had demanded money from Montoya and threat-
ened to kill him if he refused to pay.  His uncle had been killed un-
der similar circumstances.  Whilst the UK Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal recognized that “the status of being an owner of land that 
is worked for profit is an ostensible and significant social identifier 
with historical overtones” in Colombia,154 ultimately “landowner-
ship” could not be recognized as it was not a fundamental charac-
teristic that the applicant could not change nor should not be re-
                                                                                                                                   
server’ approach [i.e. social perception approach] is that it enlarges the social 
group category to an almost meaningless degree. That is, by making societal atti-
tudes determinative of the existence of the social group, virtually any group of 
persons in a society perceived as a group could be said to be a particular social 
group.”); FOSTER, supra note 6, at 14 (“In case there is any ambiguity in this defini-
tion, the Guidelines make clear that where a group is not based on a characteristic 
deemed to be either unalterable or fundamental, further analysis should be under-
taken to determine whether the group is nonetheless perceived as a cognizable 
group in that society.”); James Hathaway & Michelle Foster, Membership of a Par-
ticular Social Group, 15 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 477, 484 (2003) (“the test is overly broad, 
and need not affect any meaningful delimitation of the beneficiary class.”).   
151  See A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225, 
236 (Austl.) (“I see no ground for holding that a characteristic must be ‘innate or 
unchangeable’ before it can distinguish a social group. If a characteristic distin-
guishes a social group from society at large and attracts persecution to the mem-
bers of the group that is so distinguished, I see no reason why a well-founded fear 
of that persecution might not support an application for refugee status”). See also 
Aleinikoff, supra note 6 at 272, 295, 297–98 (describing that while a protected char-
acteristics approach would likely encompass all those covered by a social percep-
tion analysis, the reverse may not be true). 
152 See Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Montoya, Appeal No. 
CC/15806/2000, 13–15 (27 Apr. 2001) (IAT) (Eng.).  The case was subsequently 
upheld on appeal to the U.K. Court of Appeals.  Montoya v. Sec’y of State for the 
Home Dep’t, [2002] I.N.L.R. 399 (U.K.). 
153 Aleinikoff, supra note 6, at 295. 
154 Id.  
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quired to change.155  In comparison, an application of the social 
perception approach would have qualified the PSG for protection 
given that Colombian society perceived landowners to be a social 
group.156 
The concern of adopting the social distinction test would there-
fore appear to be misplaced as those groups that would always 
have met the protected characteristics approach would necessarily 
meet the social distinction approach.  This supposition would be 
correct if the BIA’s social distinction analysis is indeed synony-
mous with the social perception approach endorsed by the 
UNHCR and as applied by countries such as Australia and, more 
recently, the United Kingdom.  However, this is highly questiona-
ble.  While there is commonality between the two approaches, they 
are not equivalent.  
Social distinction as a construct may well yield a narrower 
band of protected groups than the social perception approach be-
cause, simply put, its scope is more limited.  For a PSG to satisfy 
the social distinction approach requires that the relevant society 
“perceives, considers, or recognizes persons sharing the particular 
characteristic to be a group.”157  In comparison, the social percep-
tion test does “not [require] that the group must be recognised or 
perceived within the society, but rather that the group must be dis-
tinguished from the rest of the society.”158  One way of establishing 
that the group is distinguished from the rest of the society “is by 
examining whether the society in question perceives there to be 
such a group.”159  This is where the two tests correspond.  Where 
they diverge is that social perception, unlike social distinction, rec-
155  Id. 
156 Although the IAT determined that “prosperous landowners in Columbia” 
were perceived as a group by Columbian Society, asylum was ultimately refused 
as UK law at that time required assessment of a PSG based solely upon the Acosta 
protected characteristics approach.  Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t v. Montoya, 
Appeal No. CC/15806/2000 12 (27 Apr. 2001) (IAT) (Eng.) (interpreting Islam v. 
Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and 
Another Ex Parte Shah [1999] 2 A.C. 629 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.)) and de-
termining that the group’s characteristic “must be one that is immutable or, put 
summarily, is beyond the power of the individual to change except at the cost of 
renunciation of fundamental human rights.”).  The IAT also referred with approv-
al to Acosta in providing this guidance. 
157 In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 217 (BIA 2014). 
158  S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2004) 217 CLR 
387, 398 (Austl.). 
159  Id. at 397–98. 
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ognizes that a group can be cognizable as a result of cultural, so-
cial, religious, and legal factors that exist in the given society even 
if it is the case that the PSG is not perceived by the society in ques-
tion to exist.160  The Australian High Court elucidated when a 
group will be “distinguished” from society rather than “perceived” 
by reference to the case of Khawar161 and the claimed PSG of “Mar-
ried Pakistani Women.”162  The Court was of the opinion that it 
could not be proven that “Married Pakistani Women” were con-
sciously perceived to be a particular social group by Pakistani Soci-
ety.163  Despite this, the Court concluded that the PSG nevertheless 
existed:  “the operation of cultural, social, religious and legal fac-
tors, rather than any perceptions held by the community, . . . de-
termin[ed] that married Pakistani women were a group that was 
distinguished or set apart from the rest of the community.” 164  The 
social perception analysis, therefore, permits the establishment of a 
PSG either by virtue of societal perceptions or by reference to cul-
tural, social, religious, or legal factors, which have differentiated 
the group, and thereby made it a cognizable group within the soci-
ety in question.  This approach recognizes that PSGs can exist even 
where societies refuse to acknowledge their existence165 or where 
160  Id. at 399, 400, 404, 413.  See also id. at 408 (according to McHugh J:  “To 
qualify as ‘a particular social group,’ the group must be a cognisable group within 
the relevant society, but it is not necessary that it be recognized as a group that is 
set apart from the rest of that society.”). 
161 Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v Khawar, (2002) 210 
CLR 1 (Austl.). 
162 S, 217 CLR at 398. 
163 Id. 
164 Id.  Such an approach overcomes the need to artificially create a group 
which for example the United States has struggled with in its recognition of wom-
en within given societies constituting a PSG.  See, e.g., HongYing Gao v. Gonzales, 
440 F.3d 62, 70 (2d Cir. 2006) (“women who have been sold into marriage (wheth-
er or not that marriage has yet taken place) and who live in a part of China where 
forced marriages are considered valid and enforceable”); Rreshpja v. Gonzales, 
420 F.3d 551, 555 (6th Cir. 2005) (rejecting “young (or those who appear to be 
young), attractive Albanian women who are forced into prostitution” as a PSG); In 
re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357, 358 (BIA 1996) (“young women of the Tchama-
Kunsuntu Tribe who have not had FGM, as practiced by that tribe, who oppose 
the practice”).  Gao was accepted as to the PSG but vacated on other grounds.  
Keisler v. Gao, 552 U.S. 801, 801 (2007). 
165  See S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2004) 217 
CLR 387, 410 (Austl.) (referring to the consolidated cases of Appellant S395/2002 
v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs and Appellant S396/2002 v 
Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2003) 216 CLR 473 (Austl.) in 
which the evidence was that Bangladeshi society denied the existence of homo-
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societies do not consciously regard the group as one within their 
society,166 but nevertheless the cultural, social, religious, or legal 
factors have in reality led to a group of persons being set apart 
from the rest of society.  
 It cannot, therefore, be asserted that every group that meets the 
protected characteristics test will necessarily satisfy the BIA’s social 
distinction test.  It would appear that immigration advocates are 
correct to be concerned about the impact that the new test of social 
distinction will have upon the ability of their clients to be granted 
asylum based upon their PSG.  The upside is, as the Australian 
High Court has asserted, that it will only be in the rare case that a 
particular social group is distinguished by society and not at the 
same time perceived to exist.167 
More problematic are the practical hurdles that an applicant 
will now face.  Proving the perception of a society half a world 
away is likely to present a significant evidentiary challenge for 
most asylum seekers.  An applicant is now required to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that either their country or the 
smaller section of the society from which they fled perceives the 
existence of the claimed social group.168  Objective evidence, in-
cluding “country conditions reports, expert witness testimony, and 
press accounts of discriminatory laws and policies, historical ani-
mosities, and the like,”169 the BIA has stated, will provide the nec-
essary evidence.  It is this type of evidence that is also commonly 
used to support the social perception approach, but this has not 
proven to be without difficulties.170  
sexuals, but nevertheless “police, hustlers and others in that society singled ho-
mosexuals out for . . . persecution . . . . [It was determined that] [o]bjectively, ho-
mosexuals in Bangladeshi society comprise ‘a particular social group,’ whether or 
not that society recognizes them as such.”). 
166 See S, 217 CLR at 410–11 (“The Taliban practised ad hoc, random, forcible 
recruitment of young men, where the only apparent criterion for recruitment was 
that the young men be able-bodied.”).   
167  See id. at 410 (“No doubt such cases are likely to be rare.”). 
168  See In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 244 (BIA 2014) (“when an appli-
cant makes a claim of persecution based on political opinion or religion, he or she 
is required to provide evidence that the claimed political or religious group exists 
and is recognized as such in the relevant society”). 
169 Id. 
170 See S, 217 CLR at 400 (stating that adjudicators can “draw conclusions as 
to whether the group is cognizable within the community from ‘country infor-
mation’ gathered by international bodies and nations other than the applicant’s 
nation of origin”). 
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The challenge is that these types of reports are unlikely to ref-
erence with specificity the existence or recognition of many social 
groups.  It is implausible that country condition reports would 
state, for example, that Guatemalan society perceives “married 
women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their relationship”171 
to be a particular social group.  In the wake of In re W-G-R-172 this 
challenge is now a stark reality.  An applicant’s failure to provide 
sufficient proof of social distinctiveness is now almost a routine 
procedure for rejection of PSG claims.173 
Applicants and their attorneys need to think outside the box 
and look to sources that are not as routinely utilized as country 
condition reports, such as sociological, anthropological, and histor-
ical literature, press reports, and testimonial evidence of academics 
and others who are experts on the particular country in question as 
well as the testimonial evidence of the applicant’s fellow country 
men and women.  Additional support may be found arguably 
through an examination of cases of other State Parties to the Refu-
gee Convention, particularly those that have adopted the social 
perception approach, at least to assist applicants in unearthing the 
necessary documentary evidence to support their case.  An inher-
ent danger that is associated with the use of this type of evidence is 
that it may be alien to many asylum adjudicators who typically 
place great weight upon State Department Country Condition Re-
ports in assessing asylum claims.  The credence that adjudicators 
may be prepared to give to these additional types of evidence is as 
yet unknown. 
171 In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (BIA 2014). 
172 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). 
173 See, e.g., Vega-Ayala v. Lynch, 833 F.3d 34, 39 (1st Cir. 2016) (“There was 
no evidence that Salvadoran society regards her proposed group as distinct.”); 
Ramirez-Munoz v. Lynch, 816 F.3d 1226, 1229 (9th Cir. 2016) (“[W]e hold that the 
proposed group of ‘imputed wealthy Americans’ is not a discrete class of persons 
recognized by society as a particular social group.”); Cano v. Lynch, 809 F.3d 1056, 
1059 (8th Cir. 2016) (“[T]his evidence alone is insufficient to support a conclusion 
that Mexican child laborers who have escaped their captors are ‘perceived as a co-
hesive group by society.’”); Castro-Escobar v. Lynch, 639 Fed. Appx. 22, 25 (2d 
Cir. 2016) (upholding that such a group “is too loosely defined to meet the re-
quirement of particularity, inasmuch as the group would likely encompass a large 
portion of the Guatemalan society, and does not have the requisite social visibil-
ity”); Rodas-Orellana v. Holder 780 F.3d 982, 992 (10th Cir. 2015) (“Although MS-
13 threatened and assaulted him for resisting recruitment, Mr. Rodas-Orellana has 
failed to establish that his membership in a particular social group was a central 
reason for MS-13’s actions.”). 
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As challenging as the evidentiary burden placed upon appli-
cants is the ability of asylum adjudicators to objectively assess 
whether a foreign society half a world away recognizes or per-
ceives that a particular group of persons is socially distinct.  Objec-
tively analyzing the evidence to determine the existence of a PSG 
has proven to be problematic in those countries that have for dec-
ades applied the social perception approach, and “[i]nconsistency 
in decision-making . . . suggest[s] that there is considerable subjec-
tivity involved in assessing . . . [the social perception] approach to 
defining a PSG.”174  Adjudicators presented with the same claimed 
grouping in the same country and presented with very similar evi-
dence have come to opposing decisions as to the society’s percep-
tion of the claimed PSG.175  “[T]he subjectivity inherent in relying 
on country information to determine whether a group is “objective-
ly identifiable” or “cognisable” within a given society . . . [is] very 
clear.”176  The Australian Federal Court has expressed concern with 
the difficulties encountered in accurately identifying the “particu-
lar social group” based upon the social perception approach and 
the consequential erroneous decisions that have resulted.177  These 
errors, the Court asserts, arise from not only the actions of the ad-
judicators in evaluating the evidence but also from the point of 
view of the applicant in knowing what and how to establish the 
claimed PSG.178   
 The United States’ own jurisprudence is indicative of the 
dangers and difficulties associated with the subjective assessment 
of objective evidence.  As previously discussed, the Board’s former 
social visibility test had led to some circuits recognizing, and others 
rejecting, the existence of PSGs in respect to similarly situated 
claims.  Arguably the clarity brought by the Board’s 2014 decisions 
should overcome these difficulties.  However, this is yet to be 
174  FOSTER, supra note 6, at 37, n. 216. 
175 See id. (referring, for example, to decisions of the Australian Refugee Re-
view Tribunal in 2009 that accepted without question that “high profile failed asy-
lum seekers” were a PSG in Rwanda and later that same year rejected the exist-
ence of the group on almost identical facts). 
176 Id. 
177  MZXDQ v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, [2006] 
FCA 1632, ¶ 23 (Fed. Ct. of Austrl.).  See also FOSTER, supra note 6, at 38 (referring 
to the same case). 
178 MZXDQ, [2006] FCA. at ¶ 23. 
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proven, and in fact, several post In re W-G-R-179 decisions have 
been remanded due to the Board’s failure to adhere to its new 
precedent and objectively assess the social distinction requirement.  
The Ninth Circuit remanded the case of Pirir Boc v. Holder to the 
BIA to consider the evidence submitted by the applicant in support 
of the existence of the group within Guatemalan society.180  The 
Board’s conclusion that the claimed PSG, “persons taking concrete 
steps to oppose gang membership and gang authority,”181 lacked 
social distinction and particularity was based upon their prior con-
clusions in similar cases and without any evaluation of the evi-
dence the applicant had submitted to support that in Guatemalan 
society this group is distinct.182  The Board in In re W-G-R- had con-
cluded that while the ultimate determination that a PSG did or did 
not exist in a given case was a question of law, “the analysis of a 
particular social group claim is based on the evidence presented 
and is often a fact-specific inquiry.”183  Three days after rendering 
the decision in In re W-G-R- the Board had failed to carry out this 
inquiry.184  
Oliva v. Lynch185 similarly demonstrates a failure by the BIA to 
objectively assess the evidence.  The BIA concluded that Oliva had 
failed to provide any evidence other than one example from his 
179 26 I. & N. Dec. 208 (BIA 2014). 
180 Pirir-Boc v. Holder, 750 F.3d 1077, 1084 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that the 
Board failed to consider State “Department Country Reports on Guatemala, a 
Congressional Research Service Report for Congress on Gangs in Central America 
. . . and background documents including news articles and Amnesty Internation-
al Reports on Guatemala” and assess how Guatemalan society viewed the claimed 
group). 
181  Id. at 1080. 
182  Id. at 1084.  The immigration judge who had assessed the evidence had, in 
comparison, concluded that Guatemalan society understood that there were those 
who were making a concerted effort to combat gang activity and Pirir-Boc, 
through his actions, would be perceived as associated with this group. 
183 26 I. & N. Dec. at 209–10. 
184  See also Gonzalez v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 820 F.3d 399, 401, 405 (11th Cir. 2016) 
(recently upholding the BIA’s decision that “former members of the Mara–18 gang 
from Honduras” were not a PSG based upon its prior precedential decisions in In 
re W-G-R- and In re E-A-G-).  The Eleventh Circuit gave deference to the BIA’s de-
cision because it was based upon two prior BIA precedential decisions.  Id. at 405. 
Given that the evidence of the existence of a group may well change over time, 
become more distinct, or that more viable evidence may come to light, finding 
that a claimed PSG does not exist based upon a prior decision is a dangerous 
precedent to follow. 
185 Oliva v. Lynch, 807 F.3d 53, 61 (4th Cir. 2015). 
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own testimony that former gang members were socially distinct.186  
This conclusion was reached without reference to reports submit-
ted by the applicant which “evidence[d] . . . government- and 
community-driven programs to help former gang members reha-
bilitate themselves and an affidavit from a community organizer 
who stated that former gang members who leave the gang for reli-
gious reasons become seriously and visibly involved in church-
es.”187  
Most recently the Second Circuit remanded a decision of the 
Board; this time the error occurred when the Board failed to evalu-
ate the PSG as articulated by the applicant.188  The applicant 
claimed that he faced persecution because of his membership in the 
“Association of Cattlemen and Farmers of Chanmagua.”189  The 
Board diluted the potential distinctiveness of the claimed PSG by 
generalizing it and asserting the applicant did not “sufficiently 
demonstrate that the business people associated with farmers and 
ranchers, who also provide support for the poor, are perceived, 
considered, or recognized by Guatemalan society to be a distinct 
social group.”190   
Despite these erroneous attempts, the BIA has demonstrated 
that objective analysis of the social distinction requirement is pos-
sible in In re A-R-C-G-, involving a claim based upon the PSG of 
“married women in Guatemala who are unable to leave their rela-
tionship.”191  The Board was willing to rely upon a Canadian 
Broadcasting Corporation Report that demonstrated a culture of 
“machismo and family violence” in Guatemala and Country Con-
dition Reports that evidenced sexual offenses against women, in-
cluding spousal rape, were a serious problem and that the laws in 
place to prosecute domestic violence were not enforced.192  From 
186 Id. 
187  “[T]he BIA failed to address any of the other evidence that Oliva put 
forth, including evidence of government-and community-driven programs to help 
former gang members rehabilitate themselves and an affidavit from a community 
organizer who stated that former gang members who leave the gang for religious 
reasons become seriously and visibly involved in churches.”  Id.  
188 Morales–Espania v. Lynch, 651 Fed. Appx. 40, 44 (2d Cir. 2016). 
189 Id. 
190 Id.  
191  26 I. & N. Dec. 388, 389 (BIA 2014).  This decision was handed down by 
the Board after its decision in Oliva v. Lynch and 15 months before the Fourth Cir-
cuit’s decision. 
192  Id. at 394. 
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this evidence, the Board was prepared to conclude that Guatema-
lan society “makes meaningful distinctions based on the common 
immutable characteristics of being a married woman in a domestic 
relationship that she cannot leave.”193  There was no requirement 
that the evidence submitted by the asylum applicant expressly 
state that married women who cannot leave their domestic rela-
tionship was a recognized social group.  Rather, the BIA was pre-
pared to evaluate the evidence submitted and draw the logical in-
ference that Guatemalan society recognized “married women in a 
domestic relationship that they cannot leave” as a distinct social 
group.   
In re A-R-C-G- does indeed demonstrate the ability and the 
willingness of the BIA to fulfill its obligation of objective decision 
making.194  In comparison, the Board’s errors in Pirir-Boc,195 Oli-
va,196 and Morales–Espani197 almost demonstrate an ignorance of this 
obligation; the question is why the paradox?  
One answer is that the Board may be experiencing the same is-
sues associated with social distinctiveness that other countries 
have—difficulties associated with the limited evidence that appli-
cants submit, how to best evaluate this evidence, and what logical 
inferences can be drawn concerning whether a foreign culture per-
ceives a claimed PSG to exist.  The evidence in In re A-R-C-G- may 
simply have been more well developed and easier to understand 
and the cultural norms more explicit, allowing objective decision 
making to more readily transpire.  
Alternatively, it could be argued that the Board’s methodology 
in the three remanded cases was contrived for the specific purpose 
of non-recognition of the applicants’ claimed PSGs.  Each of these 
cases involved applicants who were either former gang members 
or had opposed gang activities.  Applicants that pose a danger in 
one way or another to U.S. society; and consequently their unde-
sirability primed the Board to undertake subjective rather than ob-
jective decision making.  In comparison In re A-R-C-G- did not pose 
such a threat, victims of domestic violence now being viewed by 
193 Id. 
194 See generally In re A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014). 
195 750 F.3d 1077 (9th Cir. 2014). 
196 807 F.3d 53 (4th Cir. 2015). 
197 651 Fed. Appx. 40 (2d Cir. 2016). 
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the U.S. as worthy of a grant of asylum.198 
At this point it is still conjecture as to which of the two prof-
fered explanations is correct. Only with further development of so-
cial distinction jurisprudence will the true rationale become appar-
ent.  What is known at this point though is that the potential does 
exist to use the social distinctiveness requirement to surreptitiously 
screen out groups that are considered unpalatable.  
4.2.  Particularity v. Cognizability 
According to the UNHCR, particularity has the effect of exclud-
ing social groups that would otherwise qualify for protection and 
is therefore inconsistent with the tenor of the Refugee Convention 
and Protocol.199  The United States is not the only country, howev-
er, to measure the particularity of an asserted group.  Other parties 
to the Convention, including Australia, the United Kingdom, and 
New Zealand, require the claimed social group meet the require-
ment of “particularity,” or as these countries term it, “cognizabil-
ity.”200  
Like particularity, cognizability requires that the claimed PSG 
is capable of recognition within the society in question and not 
simply a sweeping demographic:  
The group must in fact be . . . a particular social group. It is 
not enough that its members form a demographic division 
of the relevant society, such as people aged thirty-three or 
those earning above or below a certain amount per annum. 
198 It has been ventured that post-2004 there had been a growing consensus 
among immigration judges to recognize PSGs based upon domestic violence, pro-
vided the applicant victim was able to demonstrate that domestic violence was 
endemic in their country, there was lack of protection by their own state and they 
were unable to leave the relationship.  Matter of A-R-C-G, Board of Immigration 
Appeals Holds That Guatemalan Woman Fleeing Domestic Violence Meets Threshold 
Asylum Requirement, Recent Adjudication: 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014), 128 
HARV. L. REV. 2090, 2094 (2015).  
199 UNHCR Rivera-Barrientos, supra note 94. 
200  K v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Fornah v. Sec’y of State for the 
Home Dep’t, [2007] 1 A.C. 412, 431–32 (U.K); A v Minister for Immigration and 
Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225, 305 (Austl.); Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 
56 (N.Z.). 
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. . . [T]he words ‘‘particular’’ and ‘‘social’’ indicate that the 
term ‘‘a particular social group’’ ‘‘is not apt to encompass 
every broadly defined segment of those sharing a particular 
country of nationality.’’ A demographic division of persons 
may constitute a group because, for statistical or recording 
purposes, those persons may be properly classified or con-
sidered together. Nevertheless, such a group of persons is 
not necessarily ‘‘a particular social group’’ within the mean-
ing of Art 1A(2) of the Convention.201 
This explanation of cognizability by the Australian High Court 
is arguably equivalent to particularity and the Board’s explanation 
that to meet the particularity requirement the PSG “must not be 
amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective”202 and that “major 
segments of the population will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct 
social group.”203  Upon closer examination, the two approaches are 
not synonymous, although there is definite commonality.  
 Cognizability requires that the group have a characteristic 
which sets it apart from the rest of society.  This is what makes the 
group particular.204  This is where the two approaches overlap:  the 
BIA has asserted that in applying the test of particularity “it may 
be necessary to take into account the social and cultural context of 
the alien’s country of citizenship or nationality” to determine 
whether it is a discrete group recognizable within that society.205  
Where the two approaches vary is that the size of the group is 
201 S v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, (2004) 217 CLR 
387, 409 (Austl.).  See also A, 190 CLR at 241 (echoing a similar definition of “par-
ticular”). 
202 In re M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 239 (BIA 2014). 
203  See id. at 239 (citing with approval Ochoa v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1166, 
1170–71 (9th Cir. 2005)).  
204 See A, 190 CLR at 241 (“The word ‘particular’ in the definition merely in-
dicates that there must be an identifiable social group such that a group can be 
pointed to as a particular social group. A particular social group, therefore, is a 
collection of persons who share a certain characteristic or element which unites 
them and enables them to be set apart from society at large. That is to say, not on-
ly must such persons exhibit some common element; the element must unite 
them, making those who share it a cognisable group within their society.”).  See also K 
v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Fornah v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department, [2007] 1 A.C. 412, 419 (U.K) (noting similar comments made by the
House of Lords).
205 In re W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 214 (BIA 2004). 
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an important indicator of particularity but not cognizability.  The 
Board and several of the Federal Circuit Courts have rejected PSGs 
because of numerosity concerns, asserting that the PSG was too 
amorphous.206  While these cases occurred prior to clarification of 
the tripartite test, the Board’s 2014 elucidation of particularity 
without a doubt endorsed the relevancy of size.  This is demon-
strated by the rationalization that particularity is necessary to put 
outer limits207 on the PSG definition and the Board’s citation with 
approval to the Ninth Circuit’s dicta that “major segments of the 
population will rarely, if ever, constitute a distinct social group.”208   
Particularity is satisfied, therefore, by providing a sufficiently 
discrete label for the claimed PSG, a descriptor that is not consid-
ered “amorphous, overbroad, diffuse, or subjective.”209  While ap-
plicants and their counsel can, and do, craft narrowly articulated 
descriptors for their PSG, the downside is the difficulty in being 
able to prove that the group is socially distinct given that it has 
been artificially contrived for the purposes of obviating numerosity 
concerns.  It places the applicant in a Catch 22 situation:  if the ap-
plicant articulates the group as it is perceived in their society, it is 
likely to be regarded as too large; but if the PSG is constructed nar-
rowly, then it is unlikely the applicant will be able to prove that the 
PSG is recognized by their society.210  
In comparison, size is not a relevant consideration in the appli-
cation of cognizability.211  A sweeping demographic is not the same 
206 See Portillo v. U.S. Attorney Gen., 435 Fed. App'x 844, 847 (11th Cir. 2011) 
(arguing that the PSG “serve[s] as a catch-all for every former military member 
who did not fall within one of the five protected groups, creating numerosity con-
cerns”); In re S-E-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. 579, 584 (BIA 2008) (concerning the Board’s 
noting that “the size of the proposed group may be an important factor in deter-
mining whether the group can be . . . recognized . . . .”); In re A-M-E- & J-G-U-, 24 
I. & N. Dec. 69, 76 (BIA 2007) (“Because the concept of wealth is so indeterminate,
the proposed group could vary from as little as 1 percent to as much as 20 percent
of the population, or more”).  See also Malonga v. Mulasey, 546 F. 3d 546, 553 (8th
Cir. 2008) (discussing when a social group is too broad to qualify for asylum).
207  W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 214. 
208 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239 (citing with approval Ochoa v. Gonzales, 
406 F.3d at 1166, 1170–71).  
209 M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 239. 
210 Nicholas Bednar, Social Group Semantics: The Evidentiary Requirements of 
“Particularity” and “Social Distinction” in Pro Se Asylum Adjudications, 100 MINN. L. 
REV. 355, 383 (2015). 
211  See Spain Tribunal Supremo of Spain in STS 6862/2011, at 7 (Oct. 24, 2011) 
(Adrienne Anderson trans., cited in FOSTER, supra note 6) (“In fact, the group size 
is not an important criterion”); Montoya v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, 
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as a large social group.  While the group in question may appear at 
first glance to be a demographic because it possesses characteristics 
that apply to populations generally, such as being male, female, 
married, unmarried, youth, adult, urban, or landowner, the num-
ber of persons within a population that share these attributes is not 
what determines if the group is or is not a “particular” social 
group.  What determines if the group is cognizable is whether per-
sons who share the common characteristic or characteristics are set 
apart from the society in general.212  If they are, then they are part 
of a “particular social group” no matter the size of the group or 
how generally the words describing the group may appear on their 
face.  This is recognized by countries that apply either the protect-
ed characteristics approach or the social perception approach.213  
[2002] I.N.L.R. 399, 409 (U.K.) (“there is nothing in principle to prevent the size of 
the PSG being large (e.g. women), but if the claim relies on some refinement or 
sub–category of a larger group, care must be taken over whether the resultant 
group is still definable independently of their persecution”); Refugee Appeal No. 
71427/99, [2000] NZAR 545, ¶ 109 (N.Z) (“[t]he size of the group cannot be a lim-
iting factor given the breadth of application of the other four Convention catego-
ries.”);  A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 CLR 225, 241 
(Austl.) (per. Dawson J:  “I can see no reason to confine a particular social group 
to small groups or large ones; a family or a group of millions may each be a par-
ticular social group”).  See also Chairperson Guidelines 4: Women Refugee Claimants 
Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, IMMIGR. & REFUGEE BOARD OF CAN. (Nov. 13, 
1996) http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca/Eng/BoaCom/references/pol/GuiDir/Pages/
GuideDir04.aspx#AIII [https://perma.cc/4R3K-ZDE6] (“The fact that the particu-
lar social group consists of large numbers of the female population in the country 
concerned is irrelevant -- race, religion, nationality and political opinion are also 
characteristics that are shared by large numbers of people.”).  See K v. Sec’y of 
State for the Home Dep’t and Fornah v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2007] 1 
A.C. 412, 464 (U.K.) (noting that the use of size as a determining factor has “no ba-
sis in fact or reason”); IMMIGRATION APPELLATE AUTHORITY, ASYLUM GENDER
GUIDELINES ¶ 3.45 (2000) (“The fact that the particular social group consists of
large number of the female population in the country concerned is irrelevant - race,
religion, nationality and political opinion are also characteristics that are shared
by large numbers of people.”). Similar comments have been made by the UNHCR:
“The size of the purported social group is not a relevant criterion in determining
whether a particular social group exists within the meaning of Article 1A(2).”
UNHCR Guidelines, supra note 58, at 5.
212  Islam v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t and Regina v. Immigration 
Appeal Tribunal and Another Ex Parte Shah, [1999] 2 A.C. 629, 657, 660 (HL) (ap-
peal taken from Eng.); A v Minister for Immigration and Ethnic Affairs, (1997) 190 
CLR 225, 241 (Austl.); Refugee Appeal No. 1312/93, at 30, 33–34, 62 (N.Z). 
213 See Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] NZAR 545, ¶ 109 (N.Z) (recog-
nizing that while the PSG of “Women in Iran” may seem large, “[t]he size of the 
group cannot be a limiting factor given the breadth of application of the other four 
Convention categories.”).  See also Fornah, [2007] 1 A.C. at 464 (accepting that ei-
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Consequently, such groups as “Women in Iran,”214 “Homosexual 
men in Bangladesh,”215 and “Children from Afghanistan [without 
parents],”216 have been recognized as particular social groups.  
These PSGs would, on their face, appear to be sweeping de-
mographics and groups that are amorphous, overbroad, and too 
diffuse according to the Board of Immigration Appeals, but as the 
English Court of Appeal observed, this fails to take into account 
“that a ‘particular social group’ cannot be identified in the abstract.  
It is necessary to identify the society of which it forms part in order 
to identify whether” the PSG is set apart from society in general.217  
If it is set apart from society, then it is a “particular social group.”  
Cognizability in these countries is, therefore, assessed as an implic-
it component of the social perception approach or of the funda-
mental characteristics approach and not a separate criterion that 
applicants must prove and without doubt, size is not a relevant in-
dicator. 
While some may argue that the recent decision of In re A-R-C-
G-218 signals a willingness of the Board to step away from the size 
concern of earlier decisions, it is unlikely that this will be the 
case.219  If size was not an issue, then the Board would have been 
ther uninitiated indigenous females in Sierra Leone or women in Sierra Leone 
were acceptable as particular social groups and citing with approval to the 
UNHCR guidelines that the size of the group is irrelevant).  See Montoya, [2002] 
I.N.L.R. at 409 (“there is nothing in principle to prevent the size of the PSG being
large.”); IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE BOARD OF CANADA, MEMBERSHIP OF A
PARTICULAR SOCIAL GROUP AS A BASIS FOR A WELL-FOUNDED FEAR OF PERSECUTION -
FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS ¶ 3 (1991), http://www.refworld.org/docid/
3ae6b32510.html [https://perma.cc/9KP8-U43T] (noting that “[g]roup size is ir-
relevant”).
214  Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99, [2000] NZAR ¶ 9 (N.Z.). 
215 Appellant S395/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Af-
fairs and Appellant S396/2002 v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Af-
fairs, (2003) 216 CLR 473, ¶ 81 (Austl.). 
216  LQ (Age: Immutable Characteristic) Afghanistan [2008] U.K.A.I.T. 00005, 
¶ 6 [U.K.].  But see HK (Afghanistan) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2012] 
E.W.C.A. Civ. 315, ¶¶ 7–9 (U.K.) (strongly suggesting that the group was more 
limited than all children in Afghanistan and should be limited to those who had 
no parents to provide protection).  
217 Fornah v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dep’t, [2005] 1 W.L.R. Imm. 3773, 
3778 (U.K. Ct. of App.). 
218 26 I. & N. Dec. 388 (BIA 2014). 
219  Decisions post A-R-C-G- are indicative that “particularity” will continue 
to act as a control on large social groups.  See, e.g., Castro-Escobar v. Lynch, 639 
Fed. Appx. 22, 26 (2d Cir. 2016) (supporting the Board’s decision rejecting “Cas-
tro–Escobar's putative particular social group made up of Guatemalans opposed 
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prepared to determine, as submitted by the American Immigration 
Lawyers Association, the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, and the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, “that gen-
der alone should be enough to constitute a particular social group 
in this matter.”220  The issue was sidestepped as unnecessary given 
that the proffered PSG of “married women in Guatemala who are 
unable to leave their relationship” had been recognized.221  If the 
Board had accepted that gender can constitute a particular social 
group, it would have run the inherent danger of impliedly sup-
porting the recognition of other generally labeled groups such as 
“homeless youth within Country X” or “young women living in 
gang territory,”222 groups that the Board has clearly sought to ex-
clude from Convention protection.  
Ultimately, the Board’s construct of particularity is like social 
distinction, a fertile area for subjective decision-making.  Stating 
that the group is too amorphous or overbroad to constitute a par-
ticular social group arms decision-makers with the latitude to dis-
count groups under the guise of demographics and size.  It permits 
adjudicators to manipulate the outcome of a PSG claim and limit 
asylum to those groups considered to be desirable and not apt to 
arrive at the border in great numbers.  
to gangs and gang violence . . . [because] such a group ‘is too loosely defined to 
meet the requirement of particularity, inasmuch as the group would likely en-
compass a large portion of the Guatemalan society.’”); Aguilon–Lopez v. Lynch, 
No. 15-2570, 2016 WL 7210071, 3 (1st Cir. Dec. 12, 2016) (confirming that the 
claimed PSG, “residents of Guatemala who have been threatened with gang vio-
lence and recruitment to a gang, and have refused,” lacked particularity; it was  
“comprised of people from an impermissibly broad variety of ages and back-
grounds,” lacked specificity as to the “type of conduct that may be considered 're-
cruit[ment]' and the degree to which a person must display 'resist[ance],’” and 
lacked “accurate separation of members from nonmembers”); Lopez–Diaz v. 
Lynch, No. 15-2722, 2016 WL 5799264, 2 (2d Cir. Oct. 4, 2016) (agreeing that “the 
boundaries of Lopez–Diaz's proposed group are overbroad and narrowed only by 
subjectively defined factors that do not “provide a clear benchmark for determin-
ing who falls within the group,” i.e., what constitutes abuse by family members or 
vulnerability to abuse). 
220 A-R-C-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. at 395, n. 16. 
221 Id. 
222 This is subject to the applicant being able to prove through the provision 
of objective evidence establishing that the society in question views the group as 
distinct. 
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5. CONCLUSION
The Board of Immigration Appeals’ new PSG test is here to 
stay, at least for the foreseeable future.  For 10 years, the addition 
of the social visibility/social distinction and particularity require-
ments has lauded criticism and challenge from the UNHCR, asy-
lum advocates, applicants, academics, and certain sections of the 
bench.  Despite the turbulent evolution of the tripartite test, the 
Board has stood steadfast in its resolve that to establish a PSG, an 
applicant must prove that the group possesses an immutable or 
fundamental characteristic, is socially distinct, and has discrete 
boundaries.  The clear purpose of the new test is to limit the poten-
tial types and size of groups that can find protection within the 
United States.  It is an attempt to close the borders to large and 
seemingly undesirable sections of the world’s refugee population.  
In doing so, the Board is, as the UNHCR has alleged, failing to up-
hold its obligations under the Refugee Convention and Protocol. 
The turbulent road though is still to be travelled not only for 
applicants and their counsel but also the Board.  It is incumbent 
upon advocates to use the tripartite test to their advantage—to 
provide the objective evidence necessary to prove that their client’s 
group not only has an immutable or fundamental characteristic but 
also is recognized within their country of origin and that the group 
is one that, because of such recognition, is not amorphous but has 
boundaries which make it particular.  A sound understanding of 
the requirements of social distinction and particularity will enable 
asylum advocates to provide the necessary objective evidence and 
roadmap the existence of the PSG.  Difficult as the task may be, in 
most cases it will not be insurmountable.  
The greatest danger posed to any PSG claim by the new tripar-
tite test, arguably, is the ability of adjudicators to manipulate the 
outcome through subjective decision-making.  Any unfavorable 
conclusion reached that is not substantiated by logical reasoning as 
to why the objective evidence does not support the existence of the 
claimed PSG must be challenged.  Banal conclusions that the group 
is too amorphous or that the applicant has provided little in the 
way of evidence without more is a strong indication of subjective 
decision-making.  Both the Fourth and the Ninth Circuits have in-
dicated that the Board will be held accountable and required to 
provide sound reasons for the conclusions that they reach in re-
spect to both social distinction and particularity, providing an ap-
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plicant has submitted objective evidence in support of their PSG.  
It must be kept in mind that the continual challenge to the con-
cept of social visibility resulted in its conversion into a requirement 
of social distinction and a lowering therefore of the threshold for 
establishing a PSG.  Advocates need to continue to contest the 
premise that particularity equates to size and that social distinction 
is an additional requirement to establishing a PSG rather than an 
alternative means.  Continuing to highlight and draw upon the 
evolution of these factors from the jurisprudence of other parties to 
the Refugee Convention, particularly other common law countries, 
can only serve to assist in this endeavor.   
The Refugee Convention and Protocol are international human 
rights instruments to which the United States has agreed to be 
bound.  An asylum adjudicator’s duty, therefore, extends not to on-
ly interpreting and applying the asylum laws of the United States 
but upholding the international human rights obligations of the 
United States.  The result of a decision to recognize or not to recog-
nize a PSG can be one of life or death, consequently it is prudent 
that adjudicators bear in mind that in administering these laws,    
“[a]djudication is not a conventional lawyer’s exercise of 
applying a legal litmus test to ascertain facts; it is a global 
appraisal of an individual’s past and prospective situation 
in a particular cultural, social, political, and legal milieu, 
judged by a test which, though it has legal and linguistic 
limits, has a broad humanitarian purpose.”222   
222 R v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal and Ex Parte Shah, [1997] Imm. A.R. 
145, 153 (U.K. High Ct.). 
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